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Abstrak
Analisis ini berfokus pada kebijakan paradiplomatik di Indonesia dan Korea. Kedua negara memiliki kesamaan karakteristik yaitu sebagai negara 
kesatuan, dan diberlakukannya otonomi daerah pada era yang sama, 1998-an. Penelitian kualitatif ini bertujuan untuk mengkaji tipe 
paradiplomatik di kedua negara dan mengapa kebijakan tersebut dirasionalkan. Temuan tersebut mengungkapkan bahwa meskipun kedua 
negara adalah negara kesatuan, aktivisme paradiplomatik berjalan dalam berbagai jenis. Provinsi dan kota di Indonesia menghadapi banyak 
batasan dan batasan oleh peraturan nasional, sementara pemerintah daerah di Korea memiliki lebih banyak keleluasaan dan kewenangan untuk 
mempraktikkan paradiplomasi di seluruh dunia. Temuan penelitian juga menggambarkan beberapa provinsi di Indonesia menggunakan 
paradiplomasi sebagai instrumen untuk memberikan pengakuan internasional terkait penentuan nasib sendiri, dan fakta serupa ini tidak ditemui 
di Korea. Makalah ini berpendapat bahwa perbedaan jenis kebijakan paradiplomatik di kedua negara dipengaruhi oleh kondisi politik dalam 
negeri dan biasanya dipengaruhi oleh ada atau tidak adanya gerakan regional.
Kata Kunci: autonomi, gerakan, paradiplomasi, kebijakan, regional.
Abstract
This analysis focuses on the paradiplomatic policies in Indonesia and Korea. The two countries have similar characteristics, namely as unitary 
state systems, and enacted regional autonomy in the same era, 1998s. This qualitative research aims to examine paradiplomatic types in both 
countries and why the policies are rationalized. The findings revealed that although both countries are unitary states, paradiplomatic activism 
runs in different types. Provinces and cities in Indonesia face many restrictions and limitations by national regulations, while regional 
governments in Korea have more discretions and authorities to practice paradiplomacy around the world. The research finding also portrayed 
several provinces in Indonesia instrumentalizing paradiplomacy as instruments to provide international recognitions related to 
self-determination, and this similar fact is not met in Korea. This paper argues that the different types of paradiplomatic policies in both 
countries are influenced by domestic political conditions and typically influenced by the presence or absence of regional movements.
Keywords: autonomy, movements, paradiplomacy, policy, regional.
INTRODUCTION
    Paradiplomacy or foreign cooperation conducted by 
local governments, such as provincial, regency, or city 
government, is a relatively new governance practice 
phenomenon in Asia, including Indonesia and Korea. 
Paradiplomacy or parallel-diplomacy refers to the behavior 
and capacity to cooperate with foreign parties by a 
‘sub-state’ entity or regional government for their specific 
interests (Aldecoa & Keating, 1999). Paradiplomacy 
describes the global involvement of a city, federated-state 
or provincial government in a diplomatic affair 
equivalent to the state (Leffel, 2018). When state-to-state 
negotiations often fall into ‘gridlocks,’ and international 
policymaking also suffers from ‘democratic deficits’, 
city-to-city (trans-municipal) networks have received 
substantial international recognition in recent years as 
cities can cooperate on a range of global issues with 
concrete actions. Unfortunately, the role of cities in 
global governance has been largely neglected by 
international relations scholars (Chan, 2016). 
     Paradiplomatic activism is condio sine qua non with 
the policy regarding regional autonomy. Regional 
autonomy practices perform various types and experiences 
around the world. One type of regional autonomy policy 
can be observed in Indonesia and Korea, developing 
quickly at the same time, started during the Indonesian 
Reformation Movement in 1998 and during President 
Kim Daejung’s era in the same year. The type of 
autonomy shapes the mode of paradiplomacy policy in 
every country. 
   President Kim Daejung made the decentralization 
policy one of his top priorities during his term of office, 
and this policy was continued by President Roh 
Moohyun and President Lee Myung-bak (KLRI, 2017). 
This regional government was divided into the high-level 
and low-level regions. This local autonomy refers to the 
political decision-making and administration by the 
society within a certain region by maintaining relative 
independence from the central government. Local 
autonomy mainly consists of autonomy authority upon 
local affairs and budgeting capacity independently, 
organization and governance management, trade and 
promotion, either abroad or domestically (Korea.net, 
2019). The local self-governing body, playing a key role in 
Korea’s local autonomy, is the administrative agency that 
maintains close relationships with its citizens. The local 
self-governing body is made up of local citizens and is a 
legal entity. Korea has two forms of self-governing bodies; 
macro-level bodies like the Special City, Metropolitan 
City, Special Autonomous Region, Do or Special 
Autonomous Province, and primary-level bodies like Si, 
Gun or Gu. Residents may participate mainly through 
elections in the local autonomy (NGII, 2017). Explicitly, 
the paradiplomacy term is not mentioned in any Korean 
Government regulations, but paradiplomatic activism is 
commonly and largely practiced in regional governments 
to promote trade, cultures and education in other 
countries. 
  Meanwhile, Indonesia’s government regulates its 
decentralization policy through several regulations 
providing wider authority to the regional government, 
including the authority to cooperate with foreign parties 
or paradiplomacy. The main provision of local autonomy 
in Indonesia is regulated in Law No.23 of 2014 (Mahi, 
2016). Specifically, paradiplomatic authority is regulated 
in the Government Regulation No.28 of 2018 regarding 
Local Cooperation and The Decree of the Foreign Affairs 
Minister No.3 of 2019 regarding the Guideline on 
Foreign Relations by Local Government. With this 
paradiplomatic authority, regional governments in 
Indonesia can establish direct cooperation with various 
foreign parties, with either foreign regional government 
or foreign private parties. 
     By looking at the description of regional autonomy in 
Korea and Indonesia above, the type of regional autonomy 
is highly similar to the extent of its powers. However, at the 
practical level, paradiplomacy in Korea shows more 
flexibility than in Indonesia. According to Wolff (2007), it 
is related to the share of authority between the central 
government and the regions related to paradiplomacy 
matters. For the state to enjoy sovereignty as much as 
possible and for the people to benefit from it, the state 
must share the power to other players in the international 
arena, in paradiplomacy as an example, which clearly 
shows that the state remains the highest sovereignty holder, 
yet the regional government has limited authority mostly 
decided by the central government (Wolff, 2007). In this 
context of ‘sharing’ sovereignty, the paradiplomacy policies 
or politics shall be formulated with utmost care to support 
the national development. The paradiplomacy politic 
discussed in this research is the government’s official policy 
in paradiplomacy embodied in regulation-making or 
paradiplomacy practice that supports the pursuance of the 
state’s objectives. 
      Other than its positive potential in supporting national 
development, policy or politics, the inappropriate policy 
may lead to the opportunity for regional government 
ventures that may interfere with or threaten the national 
interest instead. According to Noe Cornago, the regional 
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government may establish relations with foreign 
governments to obtain recognition upon its regional 
independence or known as ‘protodiplomacy’ (Cornago, 
2018), which is when the autonomous government uses 
paradiplomacy as the instrument for secessionism 
movement (Vicuňa, 2015). Therefore, utmost attention 
in formulating the national paradiplomacy is highly 
necessary, considering that paradiplomacy may create 
either cooperative or conflictual relations with the central 
government. It will depend on the social, economic, and 
political constructions in the regional government area. 
A radical nationalist group will make the relations 
conflictual (Cornago, 2006).
       Paradiplomacy is a double-edged sword: it can be either 
an instrument for development or an instrument for 
strengthening ethno-nationalism identity to fight for its 
self-determination rights. Ethno-nationalist groups try to 
design paradiplomacy as a part of their fight to gain 
support from abroad. It happened in Aceh and Papua. 
Paradiplomacy management patterns also have similarities 
in several countries, influenced by the dynamics of the 
local political movement in which paradiplomatic activism 
is often used as the instrument in the secessionism 
movement. In other words, paradiplomacy management 
by regions with separatist movements, either in the federal 
system (such as Catalonia, Spain) or in the unitary state 
(such as Aceh, Indonesia), is reflected in its regional 
regulation regarding paradiplomacy affairs (Mukti et al., 
2019). It indicates crucial problems in Indonesian 
paradiplomatic policies about how big the sovereignty 
‘share’ is allocated to the autonomous region in its 
international relations.
    From the explanation above, this article focuses its 
discussion on paradiplomacy politics (legal policy) in 
Indonesia and Korea to identify the applied types of 
paradiplomacy policies and to explore the rational 
reasons behind the policies. In a qualitative manner, this 
article used the theoretical approach of regional 
autonomy and sovereignty sharing as the analysis 
framework by using several indicators on each type of 
paradiplomacy policy. This article argues that, although 
Korea and Indonesia have the same government system 
as unitary states and practice a very similar regional 
autonomy, there are striking differences in their 
paradiplomacy practices due to differences in potential 
threats that arise from political dynamics in the regions.
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LITERATURE REVIEW
       The central government granted regional autonomy in 
Indonesia after the Soeharto Regime collapsed, which had 
been in power for 32 years. This regime was so centralized 
that local governments only functioned as ‘implementing 
agencies’ of national development programs (Nasution, 
2016). The basic concept of regional autonomy applied 
relied on granting all government authority to regions 
outside the six fields of the central government’s authority: 
defense-military affairs, foreign policy, monetary-fiscal, 
judicial, religious and national planning. In its 
development, the authority of the regional government 
underwent revisions until 2014 when the issuance of law 
on regional government, which by observers was 
considered as a limitation of regional authority when 
compared with previous laws from 1999 and 2004 (LPS 
Initiative, 2015). Nevertheless, regional authority related 
to paradiplomacy matters is still given space in the new 
regulation, and even its implementation is strengthened by 
the Presidential Regulation 2018, as mentioned earlier.
   Meanwhile, the Korean Government designed its 
regional autonomy policy carefully during the 30-year 
preparation period, and it began to be implemented 
massively in the 2000s, making the regional autonomy in 
this country more organized (NGII, 2017). The functions 
of decentralizing government to regional governments 
involve a broad and authoritative field. In addition to the 
main functions carried out by the central government, as 
is generally the case in a unitary state system of 
government, matters relating to territorial, organizational, 
managerial jurisdiction in local government, promotion 
of general welfare, health, and promotion of industry, 
trade, agriculture, education, and all investment are left to 
the regions, although there is criticism of a tendency for 
the central government to strengthen its authority (Choi 
et al., 2012). Paradiplomacy policy becomes part of the 
authority of the promotion of industry, trade, investment, 
agriculture, education, tourism and other matters abroad 
that requires cooperation with regional governments from 
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or regional governments complements Joseph Nye’s(1971) 
of transnational relations patterns (Nye, 1971). If 
‘sub-state actors’ or ‘Local Government (LG)’ are included 
in the transnational relation patterns proposed by Nye 
and Keohane, which consists of Government (G), Society 
(S), and Inter-Governmental Organization (IGO), and 
then combined with the International Non-Governmental 
Organization (INGO), the pattern of international 
relations by autonomous regions can be described as 
follows (Mukti, 2012):
   Figure 1 illustrates that the local government or 
autonomous region is the meeting point of two types of 
lines. First, the type of line that shows the interaction of all 
domestic affairs with the central government and domestic 
society meets the second line, which describes the 
interaction in all foreign affairs with foreign parties. The 
autonomous region is in the intersection or ‘line meeting’ 
between affairs with foreign parties or foreign affairs and 
affairs with the central government or domestic affairs. 
Therefore, the importance of autonomous regions in the 
study of international relations cannot be ruled out at all, 
given that, relatively, autonomous regions can carry out 
international relations directly with foreign parties, both 
intergovernmental and in cooperation with foreign 
non-governmental actors, in which the non-government 
actors can freely bypass relations without involving the 
central government. These actors can be in community 
groups and tribes (societies), economic interest groups, 
multinational companies, and even parts of a country’s 
government bureaucracy. These parts of the government 
bureaucracy sometimes act by interacting directly with 
foreign parties without the knowledge of the central 
government (Mukti, 2013).
      Wolff (2007) stated that the central government must 
be willing to share its sovereignty with the regional 
government, and how much of the ‘share’ of sovereignty 
will undoubtedly vary in each country.  In the context of 
the ‘share’ of sovereignty between the central government 
and regional governments, a study conducted by Noe 
Cornago (2000) on paradiplomacy in Asia-Pacific revealed 
interesting facts from paradiplomacy carried out by several 
provinces in China. Xinjiang Province, China, in the 
Figure 1. The existence of Local Government (Sub-state Actors) as actors  
    of relations between nations (Nye,1971; Mukti,2012)
abroad, mostly driven by Local Government Development 
Institutes (LOGODI) attached to the institution of 
Korean Ministry of Security and Public Administration. 
LOGODI offers many collaborative programs with foreign 
sub-national parties or regional governments from abroad 
in the areas of financial assistance, local administration, 
and development in general (Tavares, 2016). 
      By granting the authority to carry out paradiplomacy 
to regional governments as happened in Korea and 
Indonesia, and generally the practice of paradiplomacy in 
European countries, the emergence of ‘sub-state actors’  
143
1990s, sought to establish cooperation with neighboring 
provinces in the west, the territory of Pakistan. Their 
motivation to establish this relation was driven more by 
the religious similarity between the majority of the 
Xinjiang people and the people in Pakistan. The Beijing 
Government strongly opposed this effort. However, 
Xinjiang Province did not want to cancel its collaborative 
efforts, so as a reaction to the stubbornness of Xinjiang 
Province, the Beijing Government forcibly closed the 
highway in the Karakorum in 1993-1997, which was the 
pulse of Xinjiang people’s transportation. The Xinjiang 
case is an example of how the central government can be 
very ‘possessive’ of its sovereignty if the paradiplomacy is 
driven by political interests and not economic or cultural. 
However, the opposite is also true in southern China, 
where the Beijing Government is promoting closer 
relations between Yunnan Province and provinces in the 
Northern part of Burma, and Guangxi Province with 
provinces in northern Vietnam.
       On the other hand, Cornago also explained the practice 
of paradiplomacy in the provinces of Jilin and Nei Mongol 
in North Korea, which took part in the Tumer River 
Cooperation collaboration initiated by the United Nations 
Development Program (UNDP). Because of its nature 
initiated by an outside party, UNDP, the collaboration 
with the regional government of North Korea was very 
undeveloped (Cornago, 2000). Furthermore, faced with 
profound domestic developments and a dynamic external 
climate, Yunnan was inspired to participate in cross-border 
cooperation and consolidate its external relations forces. It 
was followed by a discussion on how external affairs forces 
allowed Yunnan to exploit three specific resources to 
persuade neighboring countries to cooperate with it: the 
growth of infrastructure, economic statecraft and 
diplomatic efforts. Additionally, it was argued that 
Yunnan’s increased external powers had propelled its 
position as an agent in international relations toward 
recognition by neighboring countries and the Chinese 
central government (Song, 2019).
      The case of Yunnan and Guangxi Provinces is proof 
that the central government can support regional 
governments to carry out paradiplomacy if it follows the 
central agenda. In fact, Guangxi has played a crucial role 
in laying out the BRI groundwork and substantiating 
initiative policy formulation. It has served as the key 
policy implementer of Beijing. At the same time, it must 
take note of the function of local governments, as in 
Guangxi’s case, can be more than a passive reactor to 
central government policy initiatives (Li, 2019).
       The Chinese Government seems to use diplomacy to 
establish more massive economic relations with other 
countries, especially to expand its export markets and 
cultural relations. Therefore, there has been agreements 
cooperation in a fantastic amount between the provinces 
in China with the states in Canada, Australia, the United 
States, and hundreds of paradiplomacy cooperation 
formed. It is where the Chinese Government shows its 
high pragmatic flexibility in establishing international 
cooperation with various nations in the world, regardless 
of their ideological background.
     This Cornago’s study opens a new atmosphere since 
paradiplomacy has not been extensively explored in 
unitary, centralized states. Some scholars, such as Hocking 
(1986), have even called for sparing judgment as to whether 
paradiplomatic activities exist in a country by a cursory look 
at its constitution alone; instead, they have stressed the 
importance of observing the extra-constitutional actions of 
the subnational governments of a country under 
examination. The attention paid to unitary systems has 
been sparse compared with the literature examining 
paradiplomacy in federal states (Hocking, 1986). As Elazar 
(1997) and Kincaid (1990) mentioned in Liu & Song 
(2020), this neglect has resulted from the long-held view 
among paradiplomatic researchers that paradiplomacy is 
more observable in Western federations or federal-like 
nations (Liu & Song, 2020).
     Meanwhile, in Europe, the practice of paradiplomacy 
has been going on for quite a long time, which is part of the 
continuing history of integration in each country. 
According to Lecours, the practice of paradiplomacy that 
they do can be categorized into three groups: First, the 
relations and cooperation of regional governments or 
‘sub-states’ oriented only for economic purposes such as 
market expansion, investment development abroad, and 
mutual investment. This relation involves complex 
motives, such as politics or culture. The United States and 
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Australia commonly practice this type of transnational 
interaction. Second, paradiplomacy involves various fields 
in collaboration or ‘multi-purposes’, between economics, 
culture, education, health, and technology transfer. The 
concept of this relation refers to a decentralized 
cooperation model of foreign cooperation. Several 
provinces in Germany, or ‘lander’, practice this model 
relation and the Rhone-Alpes regional government, 
France, has relations with several African states such as 
Mali, Senegal, and Tunisia, as well as provinces in 
Vietnam and Poland. The third category is complex 
paradiplomacy involving political motives and specific 
regional nationalist identities. They try to establish 
international relations with great zeal to express the 
specific and autonomous national identity of their region, 
which is different from most regions in their countries. 
Those practicing this model include Flanders-Belgium, 
Catalonia-Spain, Quebec-Canada and the Basque Country 
(Lecours, 2008). Kuznetsov’s study (2015) unveiled that 
paradiplomacy policy was generally more relaxed in federal 
states, but the practice of paradiplomacy in unitary states 
showed that regional governments also carried out 
extensive international relations activities (Kuznetsov, 
2015). 
     From the various policies/politics of paradiplomacy 
practiced in international forums, the author grouped 
them into three types of political paradiplomacy: 
isolative, conservative, and progressive. In each type, 
some indicators can be used to identify a country’s 
policies/politics, as shown in the table below. By 
referring to this typological paradiplomacy table, an 
analysis of the policies/politics of the government of the 
Republic of Indonesia and Korea was carried out. 
Table 1. Typology of Paradiplomacy Policye Effectiveness
Present at the central 
level
Foreign Policy Present at the central 
level
Present at the central 
level
There is no authority 
for foreign cooperation 
initiatives, but there are 
assignments from the 
center
Diplomatic Role There is an authority 
on foreign cooperation 
initiatives, but it is fully 
controlled by the center
There is an authority 
on cooperation 
initiative, and some 
diplomacy activities can 
be carried out by 
regional governments 
(paradiplomacy)
There is only a 
representative office 




There is only a 
representative office 
from the central 
government
Local governments with 
certain criteria can 
open representatives 
abroad (person/office)
With Mandate Letter 





With Mandate Letter 
from the center (full 
power)
It does not require a 
Mandate Letter, but 





Note. Adapted from Criekemans (2006); Cornago (2000, 2010); Kuznetsov (2015);Keohane 
(1972), Mukti (2013), and Wolff (2007)
Progressive
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Foreign Policy and Paradiplomacy
      Paradiplomacy carried out by the regional government 
in Indonesia is mandatory within the framework of the 
system of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia 
and must follow foreign policy objectives. Indonesia’s 
foreign policy emphasizes solidarity between developing 
countries, supports the struggle for the independence of 
nations, rejects colonialism in all forms, and increases 
national independence and international cooperation for 
the welfare of the people. This provision applies to all 
actors in foreign relations, both government and 
non-government, at the central and regional levels. In 
national law No. 37/1999, the implementation of foreign 
cooperation by regional governments must be with 
regional governments of which the countries have 
diplomatic relations with Indonesia.
     The principle of paradiplomacy is in accordance with 
Cornago’s opinion of ‘normal paradiplomacy’, which 
must conform to the central government’s foreign policy 
so that regional government activities will be ‘parallel’ with 
‘diplomacy’ conducted at the national level (Cornago, 
2010). Control over regional diplomatic missions is 
carried out by the Ministry of Home Affairs and the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs in interdepartmental 
coordination meetings before the cooperation draft 
proposed by the regions is approved by the central 
government.
 Indonesia’s Foreign Ministry stipulates that 
paradiplomacy must uphold the principle of 
non-intervention. Several provisions limit paradiplomacy 
activities by regional governments, including (a) the 
implementation of foreign cooperation must be with 
countries that have diplomatic relations with the 
Indonesian Government; (b) Regional government 
affairs; (c) abroad regional governments and abroad 
institutions do not interfere in domestic government 
affairs; (d) in accordance with national and regional 
development policies and plans; and (e) equality of the 
status of the regional government, for example, a 
province with a province and a city with a city. 
       Supervision of these regulations is getting increasingly 
strict on increasing unconventional threats and indirect 
interventions on regional policies, which can enter 
through channels of direct relations between nations. 
This non-traditional security threat has become an alert 
for all nations in the world (Chng, Cook, & Ewing, 
2013), including Indonesia.
  Immigration, people smuggling, illegal workers, 
business permit issues in the area by foreign parties to 
terrorism are severe problems for several regions in 
Indonesia, especially in border areas (Alami, 2016). Of 
    As democratic countries with a unitary state system, 
Indonesia and Korea have the same basics in running 
government wheels. Implementing administrative 
decentralization policy toward regional governments also 
has some similarities, but it does contain paradoxes (Heo, 
2018). In this decentralization policy package, the 
authority of paradiplomacy is given by the central 
government of the two countries to the regional 
government, analyzed using the indicators mentioned in 
the table above. Indicators were verified using regulatory 
clauses in national law that must be obeyed in the practice 
of paradiplomacy for regional governments.
RESULT AND ANALYSIS
TYPOLOGY OF PARADIPLOMACY POLICY IN 
INDONESIA AND KOREA
RESEARCH METHOD
     In this qualitative study, data were obtained from field 
areas in Indonesia and Korea by interviewing informants 
ranging from leaders in governments to academics. This 
methodology was purposive in that identification of 
informants was left solely to the researchers’ evaluation of 
their compliance with the purpose of the analysis.
     Selected documents from the relevant sources, both 
in Indonesian government and Korean administration, 
local government relations reflected in official site, and in 
other institutions, were gathered and checked. The data 
analysis methodology used in this research refers to the 
technique of an immersive model of analysis, which is an 
analysis model that rests on three components: data 
elimination, data interpretation and the drawing and 
testing of conclusions. The triangulation method was 
used to verify the quality of the data before it was 
analysed further.
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Diplomatic Role
     The diplomatic role of the Indonesian Government is 
explicitly determined as the domain of the central 
government. Regional government activities with the 
dimensions of relations between countries must carry out 
consensus and coordination with the center to obtain 
approval for their cooperation. In national law No. 24 of 
2000, it is stated that the Minister of Home Affairs and the 
Minister of Foreign Affairs coordinate the implementation 
of foreign relations and the implementation of foreign 
cooperation, carried out by the regions. On the other 
hand, as a regional leader, the regional head acts on behalf 
of his region in signing cooperation agreements with 
foreign parties. The diplomatic role of the regional 
government in Indonesia is limited to its authority in 
making cooperation initiatives with various parties abroad; 
however, all activities are controlled by the center.
   Besides, in the midst of the paradiplomacy practice 
between different countries, especially between countries 
that adhere to the federal system and the unitary state 
system (Lequesne & Paquin, 2017), the Indonesian 
Government applies equalization in paradiplomacy 
relations. The Indonesian Government stipulates in its 
constitution that regional government cooperation must 
meet the requirements of equality of government or 
territorial status, for example, provinces with provinces 
and cities with other cities abroad. This principle is 
closely related to security reasons and exploitation of 
regional resources by foreign parties, including avoiding 
social hazards that might be caused by unbalanced 
relations. Between a province in Indonesia and a foreign 
country, China, for example, can mobilize resources of 
the Chinese state to enter a province in Indonesia on a 
massive and structured basis (Henschke, 2019). It is 
undoubtedly highly dangerous for Indonesia. 
     In Korea, the center authorizes regional government 
initiatives on foreign cooperation, and some of its 
diplomatic activities can be carried out by local 
governments. The local government designs and 
implements its economic and trade diplomacy globally 
course, in general, it influences Indonesian security 
architecture (Surwandono & Ramadhani, 2016). Security 
considerations in the national paradiplomacy policy of a 
country are a necessity primarily related to human 
securities issues (Rodrigues & Mattioli, 2017). In this 
situation, the Indonesian Government’s position to 
tighten its supervision of regional governments in carrying 
out their paradiplomacy finds their reasons, although this 
limitation and supervision of paradiplomacy can be seen 
as a ‘lack of trust’ from the central government to the 
regional government diplomacy mission.
       Meanwhile, in its national law on local autonomy, the 
Korean Government provides flexibility to regional 
governments in establishing foreign relations with 
various foreign parties, both foreign governments and 
foreign privates. The authority of regional government 
diplomacy is seen as part of regional promotion efforts in 
encouraging industry, investment, trades, education, and 
tourism. There are no rigid restrictions on what regional 
governments should not do. In fact, the Regional 
Council was given the authority to resolve issues related 
to exchanges and cooperation with regional governments 
from abroad (KLRI, 2017). Indeed, the paradiplomacy 
activities must remain within the scope of the local 
government’s power and not touch the authority of the 
central government regarding Korean foreign policy.
       Regional governments in Korea have the full confidence 
of the central government to promote their specific regional 
interests abroad by collaborating with their foreign 
partners. The practice of paradiplomacy carried out by 
provinces such as Gyeongsangnam-do, Gyeongsangbuk-do, 
Gyeongnam-do, Chungcheongbuk-do, and Seoul 
Metropolitan demonstrates the freedom and capacity of 
regional governments in establishing their foreign 
cooperation. Each of these provinces cooperates with more 
than 20 foreign regional governments around the world in 
various forms of cooperation and their specific affairs 
(Korea.net, 2019). The Korean Government also gives 
regional governments flexibility to join regional 
governmental organizations in the Asian region, such as the 
North-East Asia Regional Governments (NEAR), 
consisting of 29 provinces from six countries, including 
Korea, North Korea, Mongolia, Russia, Japan, and China. 
Korea is the country with the most provinces joining this 
association (NEAR, 2017).  
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and allocates hundreds of millions of won in financial 
support. This paradiplomacy practice can be seen in 
Gyeongsangbuk-do, which expansively promotes the 
globalization of its local economy by finding various 
channels for export in global markets and sending public 
officials to potential countries to face the challenges of 
the era of economic competition around the world. The 
province sends its public officials to Tokyo (1 person), 
Osaka (1 person), New York (1 person), Los Angles (2 
persons), Beijing (2 persons), Chennai, India (1 person), 
Phnom Penh, Cambodia (1 person) for the purpose of 
lobbying and export promotion from Gyeongbuk 
(Government of Gyeongbuk, 2015). Gyeongsangbuk-do 
expanded its diplomatic activities by signing 
Memorandums of Understanding (MOU) and Friendly 
Ties with foreign sub-national and foreign private parties. 
The province also appoints its local diplomats abroad to 
support international affairs. Gyeongsangbuk has 
appointed Honorary Advisory of 95 persons in 47 
countries that were fully supported financially and other 
work facilities (Government of Gyeongbuk, 2016).
     The same practice of paradiplomacy has been carried 
out by other provinces such as Chungcheongnam-do, 
Chungcheongbuk-do, Seoul Metropolitan, and 
Gangwon-do. These provinces established paradiplomacy 
programs with the firm and clear objectives, such as 
expanding infrastructure for the globalization of provincial 
governments, enhancing global mindsets in rural areas 
through multicultural experiences, promoting provincial 
policies internationally and contributing to rural 
development in less developed countries (Government of 
Gangwon, 2018), and forming a global marketing system 
as carried out by Chungcheongbuk-do to bring out 
promotions throughout the world digitally (CBGMS, 
2018). Seoul Metropolitan independently developed the 
City Diplomacy program with its primary mission to solve 
global urban issues, to contribute to the peace and 
development of Northeast Asia, city diplomacy based on 
public-private diplomacy, and establishing foundations for 
city diplomacy. A complex international design has 
cooperated with 79 major cities around the world and 
joined 14 international organizations (Government of 
Seoul, 2019).  
       The description of paradiplomacy activities by regional 
governments in Korea shows that the authority of foreign 
cooperation initiatives owned by local governments is 
utilized optimally for the promotion of regions abroad 
without any violation of diplomatic authority politically 
owned by the central government. 
     The Indonesian Government does not allow regional 
governments to open trade or diplomatic offices abroad in 
response to the opening of regional government 
representatives since the 1990s, for example, in Western 
Australia, Johor and Penang, Malaysia, and Singapore. It is 
feared that the opening will be a door for other regions 
with particular vulnerabilities to do the same thing abroad. 
Government Regulation (PP) No. 28 of 2018 confirms in 
Article 27, paragraph (1) that the implementation of 
cooperation must meet the requirements of point (c), that 
is, the regional government does not open a representative 
office abroad (GOI, 2019).
    In this context, overall security considerations take 
precedence. The secure principle of political, juridical, 
and security becomes a severe discussion when an 
interdepartmental coordination meeting is held in 
discussing cooperation plans proposed by the regions. 
The regional government must be able to convince the 
center about the four aspects of cooperation security. 
Regional governments in submitting cooperation plans 
with foreign parties must follow their respective fields of 
authority: economic, socio-cultural, and other technical 
cooperation. It is stated that the field of foreign 
cooperation covers: (a) the field of economic 
cooperation, which includes trade, investment, 
employment, maritime affairs, fisheries, science and 
technology, agriculture, forestry, mining, population, 
tourism, environment, and transportation; (b) the field of 
socio-cultural cooperation, such as education, health, 
youth, womanhood, sports and arts, as well as other fields 
of cooperation. Areas outside these affairs will tend to be 
perceived as insecure cooperation from various aspects.
   In the matter of opening representative offices of 
foreign governments abroad, the Korean Government 
made concessions by appointing Korean citizens abroad 
Opening of Abroad Representative Offices
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to become ‘honorary advisors’ who acted as local 
diplomats residing in foreign local governments to carry 
out lobbying functions and promotion of the interests of 
local government abroad (Government of Gyeongbuk, 
2016). One honorary council from Gyeongsangbuk 
Province has been placed in the Daerah Istimewa 
Yogyakarta Province, Indonesia, collaborating since 2005 
(Mukti, 2013). Honorary advisors are functional and not 
in the form of official representatives, individuals who 
can create business networks and lobby at the level of 
government and business abroad.  
    The Indonesian Constitution states that the logical 
consequence of the Republic of Indonesia as a joint state 
system is that regional government is an integral part of 
the national government. Therefore, policies made and 
implemented by the regions are an integral part of 
national policies or national plans. In this perspective, all 
planned cooperation agreements made by regional 
governments in Indonesia must obtain approval from the 
center before signing the process. Local governments 
cannot act on their behalf, but they must act on behalf of 
the central government by granting a ‘full power letter’ to 
the regional head. The full power, interpreted as a 
mandate given by the central government through the 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, to carry out a part of the 
central government’s authority is handed over to the 
regions in foreign cooperation following the principles of 
assigning affairs to the autonomous regions. Along with 
this power of attorney, emphasizing that if there is a 
dispute or conflict in an international agreement signed by 
the regional government, then the central government will 
automatically be involved directly through its diplomatic 
apparatus to deal with the problem. Here, the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs acts as the only door for all matters with 
foreign parties, or as ‘one gate policy’, which must be 
passed in making international agreements, even if it is 
conducted by local governments (LPS Initiative, 2015).
     A power of attorney or ‘full power’ from the central 
government can only be issued if the foreign cooperation 
draft proposed by the region has been approved by the 
local lawmakers (local parliament), the Ministry of Home 
Affairs and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The oversight 
of the local parliament (DPRD) on the implementation 
of international cooperation in the regions becomes 
crucial because it relates to the use of local government 
budgets that must be approved by the local parliament.
    On the other hand, the Korean Government policy 
gives local governments authority to design, negotiate, and 
make agreements with their respective paradiplomacy 
activities. Thus, regional governments in Korea do not 
need a ‘full power letter’ to sign their foreign cooperation. 
In fact, in article number 39 in the Local Autonomy Act, 
Korea, it is stated that the local council is obliged to resolve 
any problems that deal with foreign cooperation created 
by the region. Here, the principle of decentralization of 
paradiplomacy authority is evident in regional government 
autonomy (KLRI, 2018).
      As a case in point, signing collaboration between the 
Gyeongsangbuk Province and the Daerah Istimewa 
Yogyakarta Province in 2005, the Gyeongsangbuk 
Provincial Government did not bring a full power letter 
from the Korean Central Government, even though 
Jakarta had given the Governor of Yogyakarta full power. 
This difference does not interfere with the validity and 
the implementation of productive cooperation between 
the two provinces in investment and education. 
   In the manners of the explanation above, it can be 
categorized that the types of Indonesian and Korean 
paradiplomacy policies belong to different groups. Korea 
gives regional governments more authority to participate in 
regional diplomacy and with full confidence in the regions 
to carry it out. Planning, final responsibility, and resolution 
of the problems that may arise from paradiplomacy 
activities are in the administrative area of regional 
governments. Meanwhile, the Indonesian Government 
provides paradiplomacy authority to the local government, 
accompanied by restrictions that bind their paradiplomacy 
activities. The center does not fully trust the regions to freely 
establish foreign cooperation and remain under the central 
government’s control. Planning and final responsibility of 
paradiplomacy activities are in the central government’s 
hands, including resolving problems from paradiplomacy 
activities not in the hands of local governments.  
Making Cooperation Documents with
Foreign Parties
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PARADIPLOMACY POLICY AND ISSUE ON 
SECESSIONISTS MOVEMENTS IN INDONESIA
      The unique fact in this research shows that the issue 
of paradiplomacy and regional autonomy in Indonesia is 
overshadowed by the threat of secessionists to carry out 
political movements to gain independence in their 
territories. This domestic threat condition is not found in 
the decentralization process in Korea. West Papua and 
Aceh are two provinces in which secessionists heavily 
control local politics. The Aceh conflict was formally 
resolved by the Helsinki Memorandum of Understanding 
(MOU) in Finland in 2005 between the Republic of 
Indonesia and the Free Aceh Movement (Gerakan Aceh 
Merdeka or GAM). However, the issue of extending the 
authority of paradiplomacy, proposed by former GAM 
activists who had become local political elites both in the 
executive and local councils, was vehemently opposed by 
Jakarta. Political elites in the Aceh Government endorsed 
the 2013 local regulation that attached paradiplomacy 
power to Aceh’s supreme leader, Wali Nanggroe (The 
Guardian of Aceh), to play the role of broad 
international relations authority. The Center sees it as an 
effort to seek Aceh’s legitimacy and recognition 
internationally (Mukti et al., 2019). It contrasts with 
national law, which places the authority of the 
paradiplomacy on the regional chief executive or 
governor. Responding to the dynamics of local politics in 
Aceh since 2009, the President issued a particular 
decision to regulate paradiplomacy affairs for Aceh, 
which stressed that only the governor could sign and 
carry out foreign cooperation. The presidential decree 
also requires Aceh to include phrases saying that Aceh is 
part of the Republic of Indonesia in each of its 
international cooperation documents (Mukti, 2019). 
This specific policy on Aceh’s paradiplomacy clearly 
illustrates the potential for the exercise of paradiplomacy 
authority that does not follow the central government’s 
foreign policy.
    Meanwhile, in West Papua, the Papuan Liberation 
Front politically influences the local political elites in 
running the government in this region. Local politicians 
will be at risk of not being elected if it goes against the 
large flow of Papuan people who want self-government. 
Benny Wenda’s United Liberation Movement for West 
Papua (ULMWP) has successfully collected 1.8 million 
Papuan signatures for a petition to support a free 
referendum from Indonesia (CNN Indonesia, 2019). 
Although the Indonesian Government contested the 
validity of this document, support for advocacy on human 
rights violations and references in Papua continues to 
flow from the international community, among others, 
Papuan independence support from seven pacific 
countries (FWPC, 2016), and support for solving human 
rights issues in Papua has reached 79 countries in Africa 
and Melanesia (ACPG, 2019). 
       In the eyes of the Papuans, the transfer of government 
from the Netherlands to the Republic of Indonesia 
through the New York Agreement of 1962 and the 
implementation of the Act of Free Choice in 1969 was 
not fair, although overseen by the United Nations, the 
act is still regarded as Indonesia’s military occupation of 
Papua (Singh, 2019). In fact, the British Government 
Minister for Asian and Pacific Affairs, Mark Field, 
considered the Act of Free Choice a ‘truly flawed 
process’, but said there was no international desire to 
review the Indonesian Government’s legitimacy in Papua 
(Doherty, 2019).
       The ULMWP resistance group is building its military 
wing and has officially declared war on the Republic of 
Indonesia in January 2019 from Port Moresby, Papua Nue 
Guinea (Saputra, 2019).  This ULMWP declaration of 
war was supported by the people of PNG and governors in 
the Port Moresby and Oro Provinces, who attended the 
declaration and demonstrated with thousands of people 
supporting Papuan independence (RNZ, 2019).  On the 
other hand, the paradiplomacy relation between Port 
Moresby and Oro Province with Papua Province is very 
close. This relation can be seen from the act of visiting 
each other and the presence of the Governor of Papua, 
Lukas Enembe, at the PNG Independence celebration at 
the invitation of the Governor of Port Moresby, Powes 
Parkop (Papua Today, 2018).
      From the perspective of paradiplomacy, the fact that 
the Papua Governor’s relations with the governor in the 
PNG region that all fully supported the referendum for 
Papua could lead to Jakarta’s distrust of local political 
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elites regarding their loyalty to Indonesia’s national 
integration of Papua. The Governor of Papua’s verbal 
statement indeed stated that Papua was part of Indonesia; 
however, his friendship with the Indonesian Government’s 
political opponents could be interpreted as political 
ambiguity. 
       Another fact is, the gathering of ULMWP fighters and 
the ministers of the Free Papua State in the PNG region, 
relatively free in its activities in neighboring Papua, 
including being a place of the declaration of war on the 
Republic of Indonesia, indicates the great real political 
support of the PNG political elite for the struggle Papuan 
independence. It is understandable because Governor 
Powes Parkop of Port Moresby’s capital city is a chairman of 
the Social Democratic Party. Meanwhile, the source of 
political support for the Governor of Papua, Lucas Enembe, 
is the mass base of the Papuan people who strongly support 
the ULMWP political movement. This highly dependent 
relation makes the Indonesian Government behave 
rationally to limit the authority of its paradiplomacy toward 
regional governments to avoid what Cornago (2018) refers 
to as protodiplomacy or local diplomacy seeking to gain 
international recognition for the struggle for 
ethno-nationalism to achieve self-determination (Cornago, 
2018).  Understandably, the Indonesian Government will 
keep this protodiplomacy from happening to not interfere 
with its integrity internationally.
   The Indonesian Government, in maintaining its 
sovereignty abroad and minimizing the risks using 
paradiplomacy as an instrument of struggle for 
secessionists in gaining international recognition, tends 
to withhold or limit the authority of regional government 
paradiplomacy. The authority of broad paradiplomacy, if 
it is in the hands of local elites who support secessionism, 
has occurred with Spain by issuing the 2006 Statute on 
expanding self-government for Catalonia, which 
stipulates that the Generalitat Catalonia has the 
authority to promote its interests abroad by respecting 
the competence of the center in international affairs, and 
the regional government can form its representative 
office abroad. This authority was later modified by the 
regional parliament so that Catalonia activity in other 
countries was not controlled by the Madrid government 
(Yturriaga, 2019). In 2019, Catalonia had its diplomatic 
network in more than 39 countries on five continents and 
established its embassy in 15 countries, although, in 2017, 
Madrid had dissolved all of Catalonia’s representatives 
abroad as many as 116 representatives (Government of 
Catalonia, 2019). 
      An examination of the arrangements and practices of 
paradiplomacy in Indonesia shows explicitly that 
Indonesia’s policies/politics of paradiplomacy are in the 
conservative type in the typologies. Indicators show that 
the limitations of local government authority are rigorous. 
Meanwhile, the Korean Government gives regional 
governments the freedom to conduct foreign cooperation 
with foreign parties to promote trade, investment, 
agriculture, education, and others. Seen from this side, it 
can be categorized that Korea’s policy diplomacy belongs 
to the progressive type.
    The similarity regarding the issue of paradiplomacy 
between Korea and Indonesia is on the central 
government’s role that still holds the general control on 
paradiplomatic activism in both countries, although the 
Korean Government gives more opportunities for the 
regional governments to manage paradiplomatic affairs 
technically. 
    The different domestic political conditions between 
Indonesia and Korea, related to the existence of 
secessionist movements that influence local politics, are a 
severe consideration to the Indonesian Government in 
designing its diplomacy policy in its regional autonomy 
framework. Meanwhile, the Korean Government do not 
face the issue of secessionism in its domestic politics. The 
relation between the center and the regions in the unitary 
state system has a different level of mutual trust in each 
country due to secessionism movements in some regions 
in certain countries. Indonesia is a sample of countries 
experiencing this case.
   From the paradiplomacy policies implemented in 
Indonesia and Korea, the regional governments’ responses 
to the central policy are also diverse, essential to be 
examined as an exploration and evaluation of policies 
beneficial for developing knowledge policymaking. 
CONCLUSION
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